Classic Issues in Islamic Philosophy and Theology Today

I've been waiting a while for this to come out:

“On the Prospects of an Islamic Externalist Account of Warrant,” in Classic Issues in Islamic Philosophy and Theology Today, Islamic and Occidental Phenomenolgy in Dialouge, Vol. 4, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka and Nazif Muhtaroolu (Springer, 2009).

It's available online -- if you have access to e-texts using Springerlink. It'll see print (I'm told) by December 15th or so.

The Abstract:

Abstract

Alvin Plantinga’s externalist religious epistemology, which incorporates a proper function account of warrant, forms the basis for his standard and extended Aquinas/Calvin models. Respectively, these models show how it could be that Theistic Belief and Christian Belief could be warranted for believers in a properly basic manner. Christianity and Islam share fundamental theses that underlie the plausibility of Plantinga’s models: the Dependency Thesis, the Design Thesis, and the Immediacy Thesis. Accordingly, an Islamic worldview can endorse the truth of the standard A/C model but recommend a uniquely Islamic extension. Thus, there are multiple viable extensions of the standard A/C model. That there are Multiple Viable Extensions of the standard A/C model grounds the Multiple Viable Extensions Objection (MVE): given the truth of the standard A/C model, it is more likely than not that a given extension of it is probably incorrect, thus those who accept some extension of the standard A/C model have a reason to think that model they affirm is incorrect. After considering the plausibility of second-order knowledge states and responding to objections, I conclude that because a uniquely Islamic extension of the standard A/C model advocates a limited second-order awareness condition on knowledge, it is plausible to think that an Islamic model of warrant (and its corresponding Islamic extension) suggests ways in which a satisfactory response to the MVE objection might be formulated.

OK, I turned in yet another version of my introductory chapter. Here's to hoping that it's in the ballpark this time!

Indian Epistemology, etc

I've been reading a lot of Indian epistemology recently, mostly Buddhist, both early source material and more recent explication and commentary on it. I've also been reading a lot of Japanese Buddhist philosophy, mostly Kyoto school stuff, such as Nishida Kitaro and Masao Abe.

I know these matters more than most, but as I go over them again, I see things that I've missed or misunderstood. That's making it more difficult to explain what's going on, as well as making it harder for me to present cases of reasonable antithetical disagreement about what to believe on the basis of Buddhist and Jain religious experiences, not to mention casting some measure of doubt on how it is right to say that philosophers from different backgrounds, with different starting points (endoxa), and 'foreigner' or non-native understandings of the others point of view are or could be in the same evidential situations.

Perhaps I need to make more of MacIntyre's notion of doing philosophy in a 'boundary condition' and the ideal of knowing another philosophical system/starting point as if one were a native, taking it on as one would learn a second native-language.

And also perhaps I need to set in place more senses in which people are or could be in the same evidential situation.

The weakest would be merely to accept or grant or suppose that another is in the same (general) evidential situation as you given that you have no reason to suppose that is not the case, there is some evidence that generally, you form many beliefs on the basis of shared standards of rationality, and the other has testified to you that they are aware of other sorts of relevant evidential considerations, too. That is, each person is willing to extend the presumption that the other is, generally, in the same epistemic situation, has at hand or may access the same types of evidence as you.

Or one can treat the other as if he or she is in the same evidential situation, in the sense that one will not treat the other as if he or she has some glaring lack of awareness, some deficiency, or some lack of insight into the matter of which you are speaking about, even if the other does not understand the matter as well. This would be in the case of a mentor-student relationship, perhaps, or when, say, a philosopher from the Kyoto School is willing to speak with someone about how one sees that, ultimately, reality is Absolute Emptiness or Absolute Non-Being to one who is not so familar with the Zen Buddhist tradition, at least not from an insider point of view.
Or like a top-notch analytic epistemologist who interacts with a passable one who does not balk at a 'not so good question' and rather indulges the student and corrects some misunderstanding, etc.

This seems a good time to clarify that being in the same evidential situation is more of an equal capacity to grasp and appropriately respond to evidence, whereas knowing the ins and outs of a philosophical argument or being able to fully and accurately explain the notion of Absolute Non-Being or the Regress Argument and the various ways of responding to it are more like unto having and exercising a kind of skill. In other words, it seems that those 'more advanced on the path' - by it philosophy or some mode of religious practice or 'insight awareness' out not to presume that those who are less skilled than they are in an evidential situation are therefore barred from being in that same evidential situation. Sure, there are things the student will miss or not see as clearly; but again, it is not as if the student is 'somewhere else.'

Perhaps treating the other as if they are in the same evidential situation is some sort of extension of the principle of charity, or some sort of 'yes, for all our differences, it would be wrong to say you are in a different evidential situation than I, rather, we ought to say that each of us as a more or less similar grasp or understanding of the evidence in our shared evidential situation.'

And perhaps you need to make more of the idea that what is essential here is that both parties are being equally reasonable in that same shared evidential situation even though they have an antithetical disagreement about which standards of theoretical rationality are 'in play' in that situation.

OK, now I'm just rambling, and I need more coffee. That's all for now.

Thinking about Yandell's "Epistemology of Religious Experience" and all that

Keith Yandell, in his "The Epistemology of Religious Experience", among other things, argues that Enlightenment religious experiences associated with the Jain and Buddhist religious traditions, do not provide any evidence at all in favor of Jain or Buddhist beliefs, or any religious doctrines at all. This conclusion in part follows from his admittedly plausible definition/analysis of 'evidence' he defends early on the book (working from memory here!), according to which some bit of evidence e that supports some belief that p must be disconfirmable and the evidential force of e must not 'seem the same' regardless of p's actual truth-value. Beliefs based on enlightenment experiences, failing these (and a few other) criteria, do not provide evidence in favor of the Jain View (J), namely, that "I am an eternal, enduring substance" and do not support the Buddhist View (B), that "I am impermanent, transitory, and non-substantial and composite entity", either.

In short, Yandell concludes that the nature of phenomenological reports and descriptions of the religious experiences is such that introspection on them does not and cannot provide any evidence at all in favor of either B or J (or whatever).

If Y is right about this, it seems to follow that antithetical disagreements between Jain's and Buddhists regarding the truth of J or B could not be reasonable. First, if allegedly introspective evidence based on their religious experiences isn't really evidence, then it will be arbitrary for anyone to accept J or B thus. Moreover, to accept J but not B here would be arbitrary. Since arbitrariness is not a mark of reasonability, disagreements between Jains and Buddhists cannot be reasonable. Also, it seems to follow that antithetical disagreements about whether or not introspection on Enlightenment experiences provides any evidence at all for or against J or B (or whatever) cannot be reasonable either.

My problem with all of this is that in my dissertation I am arguing that at least some antithetical disagreements about what ‘the evidence’ allegedly supports or does not support can be reasonable. I'm providing 'case study' arguments, i.e., considering cases of antithetical disagreement and showing why it is plausible to think that they are reasonable ones. But since picking difficult cases is more fun, and the pay off is better if you can pull it off, I'm making things hard for myself.

Specifically, in one section, I’m trying to show that:

(i) there are reasonable disagreements between Jains and Buddhists about whether Enlightenment experiences better support J or B, and

(ii) antithetical disagreement between Jains and Buddhists on the one hand, who affirm that Enlightenment experience evidentially support their characteristic beliefs, and those who accept something like Yandell’s view of the matter on the other, can be reasonable, and

(iii) moreover, in some instances of antithetical disagreement of the sort described in (ii), both parties can recognize that the other is being, equally reasonable in that evidential situation despite the nature of their antithetical disagreement.

This is more difficult than I had initially though.

Essentially, in favor of (i) – (iii), I’m arguing that all of the parties involved start out intellectual inquiry only after having accepted some ultimate starting points (endoxa and arche) about what is reasonable to believe and why. Thing is, that they end up with such different views of the matter From within each of these perspectives, it is possible for each party to manifest reasonability (roughly, one manifests the second-order cognitive virtue or of reasonability if one’s reasoning conforms to appropriate logical and epistemic standards and is moderately thoughtful and balanced, responsive to reasons, willing to correct one’s views in light of criticism, including self-criticism, and willing to provide others with and listen to the reasons of others) equally well, albeit in accordance with different particular standards of theoretical rationality (epistemic norms or principles that one reasons in accord with so as to get at true belief) in their shared evidential situation.

On that view (I know it’s just a sketch so far), it is possible for a Buddhist to read Yandell’s arguments and conclude: “No, I don’t think you have the correct view on the matter, and I still think I have reason to think that, ultimately, the assessment I’ve made about the evidential situation I’m in is correct, but, given where you’re coming from, and that ‘by your lights’ you don’t have good reasons to give up on these (at least not yet), I concede you’re being reasonable when you disagree with me about that.” Conversely, concerning who hold Yandell's view of the matter do, I contend, that they don’t have good reason to affirm that Buddhists cannot possibly be reasonable in reasoning as they do.

In my view, people here could say something like this: “Yes, our views are such that we’ve got a serious antithetical disagreement on our hands. However, given that our ultimate starting points are (so very) different than mine, and given that you belong to a different philosophical and religious traditions of inquiry than I, and especially since you’ve thought about the matter in light of internal and external criticism and maintain that you have satisfactory responses to these criticisms, I suppose I should concede that even if though I disagree with your verdict, it would implausible for me to deny that you are being reasonable all the same given ‘where you’re coming from and how you go about assessing these matters’ – even though I think you’ve started out in the wrong place.” (As a coda, note that only if philosophers are willing to grant that ‘the other’ reasonable, can serious dialogue about whether one party is getting at truth better than another take place.)

Hence, while antithetically disagreeing parties affirm different things to be factual and endorse different normative epistemic principles, it’s not as if one of them is necessarily ‘making some theoretical rationality mistake' when going about reasoning as they do, at least in accordance with those standards and principles each of them has reason to think are true. Of course, the goal of theoretical rationality is truth, but reasonability is not truth-entailing, thus, it is possible for people who accept different standards of theoretical rationality to manifest reasonability equally well - in that neither of them falls short of the constraints of reasonability - even though they do not get at truth equally well in reasoning as they do.

So, yeah, this is what I was thinking about today and yesterday.